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Abstract	  This	   article	   examines	   bank	   lobbying	   in	   the	   Basel	   Committee	   on	   Banking	   Supervision	   (BCBS).	  While	   excessive	   bank	   lobbying	   is	   routinely	   linked	   to	   weakened	   banking	   regulations,	   we	   still	  know	  little	  about	  bank	  mobilization	  patterns.	  In	  particular,	  when	  and	  why	  do	  some	  banks	  lobby	  the	  BCBS	  while	   others	   do	   not?	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   decision	   to	   lobby	   is	   a	   function	   of	   two	   factors:	  banks’	   organizational	   characteristics	   and	   domestic	   banking	   regulations.	   I	   test	   my	   argument	  using	  a	  unique	  dataset	  of	  over	  33,000	  banks	  worldwide	  during	  the	  period	  in	  which	  the	  Basel	  III	  Accord	  was	   negotiated.	  My	   findings	   confirm	   a	   pronounced	   bias	   in	   bank	  mobilization	   patterns	  toward	   wealthy,	   internationally	   active	   banks.	   I	   also	   find	   that	   banks	   facing	   more	   stringent	  banking	  regulations	  at	  home	  tend	  to	   lobby	  the	  BCBS	   in	  an	  effort	   to	   level	   the	  playing	   field	  with	  international	  competitors.	  This	  effect	  is	  particularly	  salient	  for	  stringent	  regulations	  on	  banking	  activities	  as	  well	  as	  higher	  capital	  adequacy	  requirements.	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It	  is	  now	  generally	  recognized	  by	  scholars	  and	  practitioners	  alike	  that	  the	  recent	  global	  financial	  crisis	  was	  chiefly	  the	  result	  of	  widespread	  regulatory	  failure	  (BIS,	  2008;	  de	  Larosiere,	  2009;	  FSA,	  2009;	  IMF,	  2009;	  Moschella	  &	  Tsingou,	  2013:	  407).	  An	  extended	  period	  of	   light-­‐touch	  financial	  regulation,	   neo-­‐liberal	   ideological	   dominance,	   and	   processes	   of	   ‘financialization’	   had	  significantly	  weakened	   the	   structures	   of	   both	   national	   and	   international	   financial	   governance.	  Importantly,	   financial	   industry	   actors	   have	   been	   greatly	   implicated	   in	   this	   process.	   Not	   only	  were	   banks,	   securities	   markets	   actors,	   and	   insurance	   providers	   the	   main	   beneficiaries	   of	  regulatory	  failure,	  but	  these	  same	  actors	  are	  often	  credited	  with	  helping	  to	  significantly	  weaken	  financial	  regulation	  (Acemoglu	  &	  Johnson,	  2012;	  Johnson,	  2009;	  Johnson	  &	  Kwak,	  2010).	  Indeed,	  regulatory	   failure	   is	  routinely	   traced	  back	  to	   the	   lobbying	  efforts	  and	  undue	   influence	  of	   these	  market	   actors	   (Igan,	  Mishra,	   &	   Tressel,	   2009;	  Mattli	   &	  Woods,	   2009;	   Young,	   2012:	   664).	   The	  millions	   of	   dollars	   spent	   by	   the	   likes	   of	   Ameriquest	   Mortgage	   on	   political	   donations	   and	  campaign	  contributions	  as	  well	  as	  AIG’s	  strategies	  to	  avoid	  rigorous	  regulatory	  oversight	  prior	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis	  are	  just	  two	  of	  the	  more	  prominent	  examples	  (Igan	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Kaufman,	  2009).	  The	  effects	  of	  bank	  lobbying	  on	  financial	  regulation	  are	  even	  more	  conspicuous,	  however,	  at	   the	   international	   level.	   The	   Basel	   Committee	   on	   Banking	   Supervision	   (BCBS),	   the	   chief	  international	  regulatory	  agency	  setting	  standards	  and	  regulations	  for	  banks	  worldwide,	  has	  long	  been	  considered	  to	  be	  in	  the	  pocket	  of	  large,	  international	  banks,	  with	  the	  regulations	  issued	  by	  the	  BCBS	  serving	  as	  evidence	  of	  excessive	  bank	  influence	  (Baker,	  2010;	  Helleiner	  &	  Porter,	  2009;	  Geoffrey	  R.	  D.	  	  Underhill	  &	  Zhang,	  2008)	  and	  even	  so-­‐called	  regulatory	  capture	  (Griffith-­‐Jones	  &	  Persaud,	   2008;	   Lall,	   2012).	   That	   the	   BCBS’s	   various	   Accords	   have	   come	   to	   serve	   as	   common	  regulation	   for	   the	  majority	  of	   commercial	  and	   investment	  banks	  around	   the	  globe	  makes	  such	  speculation	   particularly	   troubling.	   Even	   more	   troubling	   is	   that	   Basel	   III,	   the	   BCBS’s	   central	  regulatory	  response	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  suggests	  nothing	  more	  than	  ‘business	  as	  usual’,	  with	  the	   lobbying	   efforts	   of	   banks	   effectively	   taking	   the	   teeth	   out	   of	   the	   new	   regulation	   (Hellwig,	  2010;	  Lall,	  2012).	  	  	   This	  article	  examines	  bank	  lobbying	  in	  the	  BCBS.	  There	  is	  already	  considerable	  scholarly	  work	  addressing	  this	  issue.	  For	  instance,	  scholars	  have	  examined	  the	  role	  and	  influence	  of	  banks	  in	   the	   creation	   of	   Basel	   I	   (Kapstein,	   1989;	   Oatley	   &	   Nabors,	   1998),	   Basel	   II	   (Baker,	   2010;	  Claessens,	   Underhill,	   &	   Zhang,	   2008;	   Young,	   2012)	   and,	  most	   recently,	   Basel	   III	   (Baker,	   2013;	  Hellwig,	  2010;	  Lall,	  2012).	  Additionally,	  scholars	  have	  variously	  assessed	  how	  and	  why	  financial	  industry	  actors	  managed	  to	  obtain	  their	  rule-­‐making	  role	  in	  global	  regulatory	  politics	  (Geoffrey	  R.	  D.	   	  Underhill	  &	  Zhang,	   2008);	   how	   the	   lobbying	   strategies	   of	   financial	   industry	   actors	  have	  changed	   in	   light	   of	   the	   recent	   financial	   crisis	   (Pagliari	   &	   Young,	   2013;	   Young,	   2013);	   and	   the	  impact	  of	  lobbying	  strategies	  on	  financial	  regulatory	  outcomes	  and	  so-­‐called	  regulatory	  capture	  (Baker,	   2010;	   Carpenter	   &	   Moss,	   2014;	   Claessens	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   Nevertheless,	   and	   despite	   a	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renewed	   interest	   in	   financial	   industry	   actors’	   lobbying	   efforts	   since	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   recent	  scholarly	   research	   is	   relatively	   quiet	   on	   one	   fundamental	   question:	   namely,	   when	   do	   banks	  
lobby?	  More	  specifically:	  what	  factors	  explain	  when	  and	  why	  banks	  mobilize	  to	  lobby	  the	  BCBS	  in	  order	  to	  shape	  regulatory	  outcomes	  in	  their	  favor	  and,	  perhaps,	  even	  weaken	  global	  banking	  regulations?1	  Further,	  how	  can	  we	  explain	  why	  only	  some	  banks	  lobby	  at	  the	  international	  level	  and	  others	  do	  not?	  Answering	  these	  questions	  not	  only	  addresses	  a	  fundamental	  gap	  in	  existing	  scholarship	  but	  also	  speaks	  to	  larger	  issues	  of	  the	  role	  and	  influence	  of	  banks	  in	  BCBS	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  as	  well	  as	  how	  bank	  lobbying	  leads	  to	  regulatory	  failure	  and	  weakened	  global	  financial	  regulation	  in	  the	  banking	  sector.	  	  	   This	   article	   examines	   these	   questions	   using	   a	   unique	   dataset	   on	   bank	   lobbying	   in	   the	  BCBS	   for	   the	   period	   2010-­‐2014	   during	   which	   the	   Basel	   III	   Accord	   was	   negotiated.	   Basel	   III	  sought	   a	   complete	   overhaul	   of	   the	   existing	   permissive	   regulatory	   environment	   in	   the	   global	  financial	  system,	   thus	  providing	  an	   important	   incentive	   for	  banks	   to	   lobby	  at	   the	   international	  level.	  The	  central	  argument	  advanced	   in	   this	  article	   is	   that	   the	  decision	   to	   lobby	   the	  BCBS	   is	  a	  function	  of	   two	   factors:	   bank	  organizational	   characteristics	   and	  domestic	   banking	   regulations.	  First,	  organizational	   characteristics,	   like	   financial	   resources	  and	   international	  banking	  activity,	  reflect	  a	  bank’s	  capacity	  to	  overcome	  collective	  action	  problems	  and	   lobby	  at	   the	   international	  level.	   Domestic	   banking	   regulations,	   like	   strict	   capital	   adequacy	   requirements,	   impact	   the	  decision	   to	   lobby	   in	   two	  ways.	   First,	   domestic	   regulations	  work	   to	   effectively	   ‘push’	   banks	   to	  seek	   opportunities	   at	   the	   international	   level,	   especially	   in	   terms	   of	   levelling	   the	   regulatory	  playing	   field	  with	   international	   competitors.	   Second,	   banks	   seek	   to	   limit	   the	   adjustment	   costs	  between	  existing	  domestic	   regulations	   and	  proposed	   international	   regulations.	  As	   such,	   banks	  facing	  greater	  adjustment	  costs	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  lobby	  the	  BCBS.	  While	  both	  factors	  have	  been	  identified	  in	  the	  existing	  literature,	  this	  article	  is	  the	  first	  to	  bring	  them	  together	  in	  a	  single	  analysis.	   I	   argue	   that	   a	   consideration	   of	   both	   organizational	   characteristics	   and	   domestic	  banking	   regulations	   provides	   a	   more	   compelling	   and	   comprehensive	   picture	   of	   bank	  mobilization	  patterns	  at	  the	  international	  level.	  	  Controlling	   for	   a	   battery	   of	   alternative	   explanations,	   I	   test	   my	   argument	   using	   an	  econometric	  analysis	  of	  over	  33,000	  banks	  worldwide.	  Regression	  results	  provide	  considerable	  evidence	  supporting	  several	  of	  my	  main	  arguments.	  First,	   I	   find	  that	  banks’	   financial	  resources	  and	  international	  scope	  are	  critical	  factors	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  lobby.	  Banks	  with	  greater	  resources	  and	  more	   international	   subsidiaries	   are	   also	  more	   likely	   to	   lobby	   the	  BCBS,	   thus	   confirming	  a	  bias	  in	  bank	  mobilization	  patterns	  in	  the	  BCBS	  toward	  the	  wealthiest	  banks.	  Second,	  I	  find	  that	  bank-­‐lobbying	  patterns	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  BCBS	  suggest	  that	  banks	  facing	  tougher	  regulations	  at	  home	  lobby	  the	  BCBS	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  level	  the	  playing	  field	  with	  their	  international	  competitors.	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However,	  I	  find	  little	  evidence	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  lobby	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  adjustment	  costs	  banks	  face	  from	  the	  new	  Basel	  III	  rules.	  	  
	  
The	  Determinants	  of	  Bank	  Lobbying	  At	  the	  international	  level,	  the	  main	  locus	  for	  banking	  regulation	  is	  the	  BSBC.	  	  Emerging	  in	  1974	  in	  response	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Bankhaus	  Herstatt	  in	  Germany,	  the	  BSBC	  seeks	  to	  bring	  greater	  stability	   to	  global	   finance,	   especially	   in	   light	  of	  a	   steady	   increase	   in,	   and	  risks	  associated	  with,	  cross-­‐border	  banking,	  international	  banking	  competition,	  and	  trends	  in	  foreign	  entry	  (Davies	  &	  Green,	   2008:	   34).	  While	   composed	   entirely	   of	   unelected	   officials	   (mainly	   central	   bankers	   and	  national	   bank	   supervisors	   from	   the	   world’s	   richest	   countries)	   and	   lacking	   a	   formal	   legal	  personality,	  the	  BCBS’s	  standards	  and	  regulations	  nevertheless	  have	  surprising	  power	  and	  reach	  in	   global	   financial	   governance.	   Starting	   as	   a	   G10	   body,	   the	   Basel	   Committee	   now	   has	  representatives	   from	   28	   jurisdictions	   around	   the	   world.	   Importantly,	   Basel	   rules	   have	   also	  quickly	   spread	   to	   governments	   not	   formally	   represented	   on	   the	   Committee.	   Non-­‐member	  governments	   use	   Basel	   because	   they	   typically	   face	   “strong	   incentives	   […]	   to	   emulate	   the	  standards	   it	   generates”	   (Barth,	   Caprio	   Jr,	   &	   Levine,	   2006;	   Young,	   2011).	   Indeed,	   part	   of	   this	  pressure	   comes	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   various	   international	   organizations,	   in	   particular	   the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  and	  World	  Bank,	  now	  use	  Basel	  to	  evaluate	  financial	  soundness	  in	  emerging	  and	  developing	  markets	  (Barth	  et	  al.,	  2006:	  65).	  It	   is	  therefore	  perhaps	  little	  wonder	  then	   that	   Basel	   is	   routinely	   characterized	   as	   perhaps	   the	   most	   prominent	   example	   of	  international	  regulatory	  harmonization	  to	  date	  (Singer,	  2007).	  	  	  	   The	  central	  importance	  of	  the	  BCBS	  in	  global	  financial	  regulation	  goes	  some	  distance	  in	  explaining	  why	  banks	  would	  spend	  time	  and	  resources	   lobbying	  to	   influence	  the	  agency’s	  core	  regulatory	   outputs.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   BCBS	   has	   no	   formal	   legal	   personality	   and	   its	   rules	   are	  examples	   of	   ‘soft	   law’	   has	   little	   bearing	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   Committee	   as	   a	   target	   for	  lobbying.	   In	   fact,	   the	   informal	   nature	   of	   the	   BCBS	   seems	   to	   facilitate	   lobbying	   practices.	   The	  unelected	  character	  of	  BCBS	  officials	  only	  seems	  to	  exacerbate	  a	   ‘revolving	  door’	  problem	  that	  sees	   a	   tight	  web	  of	   influence	   linking	   industry	   actors	   and	   regulators	   (Braun	  &	  Raddatz,	   2010).	  The	  so-­‐called	  ‘Olympian	  detachment’	  that	  separates	  the	  BCBS	  from	  state	  governments	  and	  which	  is	  meant	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  Committee	  acts	  as	  a	  guardian	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  has	  transformed	  decision-­‐making	  in	  the	  BCBS	  into	  a	  form	  of	  “business	  corporatism”	  (Claessens	  et	  al.,	  2008:	  319;	  Geoffrey	  R.	  D.	  	  Underhill	  &	  Zhang,	  2008:	  543).	  What	  is	  more,	  both	  BCBS	  regulators	  and	  powerful	  industry	  actors	  are	  commonly	   implicated	   in	  propagating	  a	   ‘cult	  of	   finance’	   that	  advocates	   light	  touch	   regulation	   and	   liberal	   regulatory	   strategies	   (Baker,	   2010:	   653;	   Johnson,	   2009).	   Taken	  together	   these	   insights	   have	   led	   to	   a	   general	   consensus	   in	   the	   scholarly	   literature	   that	   BCBS	  regulations	  are	  largely	  shaped	  by	  the	  preferences	  of	  powerful	  banks	  and	  that	  the	  Basel	  Accords	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are	  prime	  examples	  of	  so-­‐called	  regulatory	  capture	  -­‐-­‐	  a	  situation	  where	  regulation	  is	  excessively	  influence	  by	   the	   regulated	   industry	   itself	   (Baker,	   2010;	  Goldin	  &	  Vogel,	   2010;	  Griffith-­‐Jones	  &	  Persaud,	   2008;	   Helleiner	   &	   Porter,	   2009;	   Lall,	   2012;	   Ocampo,	   2009;	   Tsingou,	   2010;	   Young,	  2011).	   Despite	   such	   a	   consensus	   amongst	   scholars,	   we	   still	   know	   little	   about	   the	   more	  fundamental	  question	  of	  why	  banks	  decide	  to	  lobby	  the	  BCBS	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  What	  factors,	  in	  other	  words,	  explain	  a	  bank’s	  decision	  to	  mobilize?	  Further,	  why	  do	  some	  banks	  lobby	  the	  BCBS	  while	  others	  do	  not?	  Combining	  insights	  from	  the	  existing	  literature,	  I	  argue	  that	  bank	  lobbying	  in	   the	   BCBS	   can	   be	   explained	   as	   function	   of	   two	   primary	   factors:	   (1)	   banks’	   organizational	  characteristics,	   and	   (2)	   domestic	   banking	   regulations.	  Organizational	   characteristics	   refer	   to	   a	  bank’s	  capacity	  to	  mobilize	  at	  the	  international	  level	  while	  domestic	  banking	  regulations	  refer	  to	  a	  bank’s	  motivation	  for	  doing	  so.	  	  	  
Organizational	  Characteristics	  	   The	  prominent	  explanation	  for	  bank	  lobbying	  in	  the	  BCBS	  is	  related	  to	  banks’	  resources.	  	  Scholarly	  and	  popular	  accounts	  commonly	  stress	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  excessive	  concentrations	  of	  wealth	  can	  translate	  into	  considerable	  political	  lobbying	  power	  for	  banks	  (Baker,	  2010;	  Johnson	  &	   Kwak,	   2010;	   for	   an	   alternative	   view,	   see	   Lall,	   2012).	   On	   one	   level,	   superior	   resources	   are	  crucial	   for	  funding	  campaign	  contributions,	  obtaining	  media	  coverage,	  and	  otherwise	  financing	  expensive	   lobbying	   strategies	   (Igan	   et	   al.,	   2009).2	   However,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   influencing	  banking	   regulations,	   material	   resources	   are	   perhaps	   most	   important	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	  relate	   to	   informational	   advantages	   for	   industry	   actors	   (Cerny,	   1994;	   Porter,	   2009;	   G.	   R.	   D.	  Underhill,	   Blom,	   &	   Mügge,	   2010).	   Technical,	   policy-­‐relevant	   information	   is	   the	   currency	   of	  influence	   for	   global	   financial	   regulation	   (Griffith-­‐Jones	   &	   Persaud,	   2008;	   Helleiner	   &	   Porter,	  2009;	  Lall,	  2012;	  Young,	  2012).	  In	  addition	  to	  having	  access	  to	  the	  type	  of	  technical	  information	  most	  in	  demand	  by	  regulators,	  superior	  wealth	  and	  other	  material	  resources	  are	  key	  to	  a	  bank’s	  ability	  to	  mobilize	  at	  the	  international	  level.	  From	  Stigler’s	  (1971)	  seminal	  work,	  we	  know	  that	  private	   sector	   actors	   with	   considerable	   resources	   have	   an	   easier	   time	   overcoming	   collective	  action	   problems	   that	   otherwise	   limit	   their	   ability	   to	   mobilize	   on	   certain	   issues	   (see	   also	  Schattschneider,	  1975).	  On	  balance,	  groups	  with	  greater	  resources	  are	  able	  to	  expand	  the	  scope	  and	  sophistication	  of	  their	  lobbying	  efforts	  and	  develop	  new	  strategies	  to	  lobby	  at	  both	  the	  state	  and	  international	  levels.	  	  
H1:	  banks	  with	  greater	  financial	  resources	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  lobby	  the	  BCBS.	  	   	  A	  second	   feature	   related	   to	  organizational	   characteristics	   is	  banks’	   international	   scope,	  or	   specifically	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   banks	   are	   internationally	   active.	   In	   one	   sense,	   banks	   with	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greater	  international	  scope	  have	  more	  at	  stake	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  international	  banking	  rules	  set	  out	  by	  the	  BCBS.	  After	  all,	  the	  various	  Basel	  Accords	  are,	  strictly	  speaking,	  intended	  to	  target	  international	   banks.	   What	   is	   more,	   recent	   empirical	   research	   suggests	   that	   these	   same	  international	  banks	  are	  the	  most	  active	  and	   influential	  when	  it	  comes	  to	   lobbying	   in	  the	  BCBS.	  Several	   studies	   find	   that	   the	   Basel	   II	   and	   Basel	   III	   Accords	   reflected	   the	   interests	   of	  internationally	  active	  banks,	  regardless	  of	   their	  national	  origin	  (and	  finances)	  (Claessens	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Lall,	  2012).	  International	  scope	  also	  reflects	  a	  banks’	  lobbying	  power.	  In	  particular,	  banks	  that	   are	   internationally	   active	   are	   better	   able	   to	   provide	   the	   technical	   expertise	   required	   by	  BCBS	   regulators,	   especially	   as	   it	   pertains	   to	   issues	   of	   international	   banking,	   like	   regulatory	  arbitrage	  and	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  cross-­‐border	  banking.	  	  
H2:	  banks	  with	  greater	  international	  scope	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  lobby	  the	  BCBS.	  	  
Domestic	  Banking	  Regulations	  Banks’	   organizational	   characteristics	   go	   some	  distance	   in	   explaining	  bank	  mobilization	  patterns	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  BCBS.	  However,	  they	  are	  limited	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  can	  only	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  capacity	  of	  banks	  to	  lobby,	  and	  not	  their	  motivation	   for	  doing	  so.	  A	  central	  argument	  advanced	   in	   this	   analysis	   is	   that	   a	   more	   complete	   explanation	   of	   bank	   lobbying	   requires	   a	  consideration	  of	  both	  factors.	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  propose	  coupling	  an	  organizational	  characteristics-­‐based	   explanation	   of	   bank	   lobbying	   with	   more	   explicit	   theorizing	   regarding	   the	   institutional	  
push	   and	   pull	   factors	   motivating	   banks	   to	   lobby	   the	   BCBS:	   in	   particular,	   the	   nature	   and	  stringency	  of	  the	  domestic	  regulatory	  context	  that	  banks	  face	  at	  home.	  Insights	  from	  the	  existing	  literature	  provide	  a	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  this	  approach.	  	  Banks,	  as	  well	  as	  interest	  organizations	  more	  broadly	  speaking,	  are	  regularly	  constrained	  in	   achieving	   their	   political	   aims	   and	   objectives	   by	   the	   institutional	   context	   in	   which	   they	  typically	  operate	  (Mahoney,	  2004;	  North,	  1990).	  Strict	  rules	  at	  home	  tend	  to	  ‘push’	  these	  actors	  to	  seek	  more	  favorable	  rules	  elsewhere.	  This	  might	  entail	  international	  venue	  shopping	  or	  multi-­‐level	  lobbying	  as	  well	  as	  a	  strategic	  shift	  in	  lobbying	  focus	  from	  the	  domestic	  to	  the	  international	  level	   (Beyers	  &	  Kerremans,	   2012;	  Keck	  &	  Sikkink,	   1998;	  Marks	  &	  McAdam,	  1996).	   For	  banks,	  stringent	   domestic	   banking	   regulations,	   like	   high	   capital	   adequacy	   requirements	   and	   strict	  regulatory	   oversight	   mechanisms,	   impose	   high	   financial	   costs	   on	   banks	   in	   domestic	   markets.	  Internationally,	   however,	   more	   stringent	   domestic	   regulations	   lead	   to	   concerns	   about	   bank	  competitiveness.	   According	   to	   Singer	   (2007)	   domestic	   regulators	   are	   often	   faced	   with	   the	  difficult	   dilemma	   of	   increasing	   banking	   regulations	   while	   maintaining	   banks’	   sectoral	  competitiveness.	   More	   stringent	   regulations	   at	   home	   make	   banks	   less	   competitive	   in	   world	  markets.	  Oatley	  and	  Nabor	  (1998)	  provide	  compelling	  evidence	  that	  banks	  also	  make	  strategic	  decisions	   about	   the	   link	   between	   domestic	   regulations	   and	   international	   competitiveness.	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Indeed,	  the	  authors	  explain	  how	  Basel	  I	  rules	  resulted	  from	  the	  US	  government	  seeking	  to	  satisfy	  powerful	   domestic	   banking	   interests.	   Basel	   I	   was	   less	   about	   addressing	   an	   international	  regulatory	  problem	  (see	  Kapstein,	  1989),	  and	  more	  about	  implementing	  rules	  that	  would	  ensure	  that	   Japanese	  banks	  were	  playing	  by	  the	  same	  (strict)	  rules	  as	   their	  American	  (and	  European)	  counterparts.	  In	  this	  sense,	  banks	  are	  pushed	  to	  lobby	  at	  the	  international	  level	  by	  their	  interest	  in	  levelling	  the	  playing	  field	  with	  other	  banks.	  These	  insights	  lead	  to	  a	  third	  hypothesis.	  	  
H3:	  banks	   facing	  stricter	  domestic	  banking	  regulations	  will	  be	  more	   likely	   to	   lobby	  the	  BCBS.	  	  Finally,	  proponents	  of	  a	  ‘realist’	  explanation	  of	  international	  banking	  regulations	  provide	  a	   somewhat	   different	   argument	   regarding	   the	   impact	   of	   domestic	   banking	   regulations.	   For	  instance,	  Simmons	  (2001)	  ,	  Wood	  (2005)	  ,	  and	  Drezner	  (2007)	  variously	  explain	  how	  states	  seek	  to	   limit	   adjustment	   costs	   of	   new	   international	   regulations	   by	   working	   to	   ensure	   that	  international	   arrangements	   correspond	   as	   closely	   as	   possible	   to	   their	   pre-­‐existing	   national	  regulatory	   frameworks.	  The	  same	   logic	   can	   impact	  a	  bank’s	  decision	   to	   lobby	   (see	  Lall,	  2012).	  The	   underlying	   implication	   is	   that	   banks	   facing	   greater	   adjustment	   costs	   (greater	   differences	  between	  existing	  domestic	   rules	  and	   international	   rules)	  would	  be	  more	   inclined	   to	   take	   their	  lobbying	  efforts	  to	  the	  BCBS	  than	  banks	  facing	  fewer	  adjustment	  costs.	  Given	  banks’	  preferences	  for	  permissive	  regulatory	  environments,	   this	  effect	  should	  be	  most	  salient	   for	  banks	   located	  in	  countries	   that	   impose	   more	   stringent	   banking	   rules.	   Banks	   facing	   adjustment	   costs	   resulting	  from	   more	   regulation	   have	   more	   to	   lose	   than	   banks	   facing	   adjustment	   costs	   resulting	   from	  deregulation.	  	  
H4:	  banks	  facing	  higher	  adjustment	  costs	  associated	  with	  more	  stringent	  regulations	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  lobby	  the	  BCBS.	  	  
Research	  Design	  In	   this	   section	   I	   discuss	   the	   operationalization	   of	   the	   variables	   considered	   in	   this	   analysis.	   In	  order	  to	  isolate	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  variables,	  I	  will	  also	  consider	  a	  number	  of	  control	  variables.	  	  	  
Bank	  Mobilization	  Patterns	  	   I	  examine	  bank	  mobilization	  patterns	  using	  data	  derived	  from	  BCBS	  official	  stakeholder	  consultation	  documents.	  Since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  BCBS	  has	  routinely	  consulted	  with	  relevant	  (financial	   industry)	   stakeholders	   before	   drawing	   up	   new	   regulations	   (Young,	   2011:	   42).	  Stakeholder	   consultation	   documents	   typical	   communicate	   valuable	   technical	   information	  regarding	   highly	   complex	   regulatory	   processes	   and,	   as	   such,	   are	   potentially	   of	   great	   value	   to	  BCBS	   regulators.	   Further,	   banks	   face	   a	   strong	   inventive	   to	   provide	   feedback	   insofar	   as	   the	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consultation	   process	   affords	   banks	   with	   a	   unique	   opportunity	   to	   influence	   and	   shape	   new	  regulations.	  Of	  course,	  consultations	  are	  not	  the	  only	  avenue	  for	  banks	  seeking	  influence:	  there	  are	  also	  several	  alternative	  formal	  and	  informal	  points	  of	  access	  through	  which	  banks	  can	  lobby	  (see	  Pagliari	  &	  Young,	  2013).	  However,	  using	  consultation	  documents	  to	  examine	  mobilization	  patterns	  and	  lobbying	  influence	  has	  become	  common	  practice	  in	  scholarly	  research	  (Chalmers,	  2014b;	  Claessens	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Klüver,	  2013;	  Pagliari	  &	  Young,	  2013;	  Rasmussen	  &	  Carroll,	  2013).	  This	   is	   likely	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   consultation	  data	  are	   commonly	   readily	   available	  online	  and	  easy	  to	  access.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  BCBS	  there	  is	  also	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  consultation	  data	  provides	  an	   important	   insight	   into	  recent	  bank	   lobbying	  efforts	  and	  gives	  us	  a	  good	  picture	  of	  which	  banks	  are	  indeed	  concerned	  about	  influencing	  BCBS	  regulatory	  outcomes.	  Specifically,	  the	  2008	   global	   financial	   crisis	   has	   shone	   a	   spotlight	   on	   the	   role	   of	   financial	   industry	   actors	   in	  national	  and	   international	  regulatory	  processes	  (Baker,	  2010).	  As	  a	  result,	   industry	  actors	  and	  regulators	  are	  now	  subject	  to	  greater	  public	  scrutiny.	  One	  significant	  outcome	  is	  related	  to	  how	  financial	  industry	  actors	  have	  adapted	  their	  lobbying	  strategies	  in	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  period	  (Young,	  2013).	  Namely,	  rather	  than	  seeking	  to	  simply	  veto	  new	  regulations	  at	  the	  earliest	  stages	  of	  the	  policy	  making	  process,	   banks	   are	  now	   relegated	   to	   negotiating	   the	   finer	   details	   of	   regulations	  that	  are	  already	  on	  the	  table.	  This	  means	  that	  lobbying	  practices	  have	  been	  increasingly	  brought	  into	  the	  light	  of	  day,	  forcing	  industry	  actors	  to	  weigh-­‐in	  on	  regulatory	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  through	  more	  formal	  channels	  of	  communication,	  like	  stakeholder	  consultations.	  	   This	  analysis	   focuses	  on	  the	  mobilization	  of	  banks	  at	   the	   level	  of	   the	  BCBS	  over	  a	   four-­‐year	  period:	  2010-­‐2013.	   Importantly,	   this	  period	  corresponds	   to	   the	  BCBS’s	  negotiation	  of	   the	  Basel	  III	  Accord.	  Basel	  III	  is	  significant	  because	  it	  marks	  the	  BCBS’s	  main	  response	  to	  the	  frailties	  of	  global	  financial	  governance	  as	  they	  were	  exposed	  through	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  Indeed,	  Basel	  III	  marked	  a	   significant	  overhaul	  of	   existing	   international	  banking	   regulations	   (most	   importantly,	  the	   Basel	   II	   Accord),	   setting	   out	   an	   ambitious	   range	   of	   new	   regulatory	   standards,	   redefining	  capital,	  increasing	  Tier	  1	  capital	  requirements,	  introducing	  higher	  minimum	  capital	  and	  liquidity	  ratios,	   and	   implementing	   a	   capital	   surcharge	   on	   systematically	   important	   institutions	   (BCBS,	  2009).	  All	  of	  these	  changes	  pose	  significant	  costs	  for	  banks,	  giving	  them	  considerable	  incentive	  to	  lobby	  the	  BCBS	  during	  the	  four-­‐year	  period	  examined	  here.	  Data	   collection	   for	   this	   analysis	   proceeded	   over	   a	   number	   of	   steps.	   First,	   I	   gathered	  information	   on	   all	   consultations	   held	   during	   the	   2010-­‐2013	   period.	   This	   amounted	   to	   1494	  individual	   contributions	   from	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   different	   types	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors.	   Second,	   I	  coded	  each	  contributing	  actor	  using	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  International	  Standard	  Industrial	  Classification	   scheme	   (ISIC	   rev.	   4),	   a	   United	   Nations	   system	   for	   classifying	   diverse	   economic	  sector	   activities.3	   This	   approach	   to	   coding	   is	   consistent	   with	   other	   recent	   empirical	   efforts	  (Chalmers,	   2014a;	   Pagliari	   &	   Young,	   2013).	   A	   total	   of	   24	   different	   actor	   types	   were	   coded,	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including,	   for	   example,	   universities,	   think	   tanks,	   chambers	   of	   commerce,	  NGOs,	   individuals,	   as	  well	   as	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   financial	   industry	   actors.	   In	   a	   second	   step,	   I	   isolated	   banking	   sector	  actors	  by	  excluding	  all	  other	  actor-­‐types	  from	  the	  dataset.	  Banking	  sector	  actors	  were	  identified	  by	   the	   ISIC	   scheme	   as	   the	   category	   of	   actors	   engaging	   in	   ‘all	   financial	   service	   activities’	   (i.e.,	  monetary	  intermediation,	  the	  activities	  of	  holding	  companies,	  trusts,	  funds,	  financial	  leasing,	  and	  credit	   granting).	   Finally,	   in	   a	   third	   step,	   I	   used	   data	   derived	   from	   the	   BankScope	   database	  provided	   by	   Bureau	   van	   Dijk	   and	   Fitch	   Ratings	   to	   code	   each	   banking	   sector	   actor	   by	   their	  specific	  banking	  activity.4	  The	  result,	  presented	  in	  Table	  1,	  was	  a	  total	  of	  517	  contributions	  from	  143	   unique	   banking	   sector	   actors	   lobbying	   the	   BCBS	   at	   least	   once	   during	   2010-­‐2014	   time	  period.	  	  	  [Table	  1]	  	  
Organizational	  Characteristics	  I	   operationalize	   organizational	   characteristics	   in	   two	   ways:	   first,	   in	   terms	   of	   banks’	   financial	  resources,	  and	  second	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  banks’	  international	  scope.	  	  1. First,	   collecting	   data	   on	   bank	   financial	   resources	   required	   linking	   the	   143	   unique	  banking-­‐sector	   actors	   identified	   above	   to	   data	   derived	   from	   the	   BankScope	   database.	  This	   database	   includes	   comprehensive	   information	   on	   banks’	   assets	   and	   activities	   for	  over	  33,000	  individual	  banks	  around	  the	  globe	  over	  a	  sixteen-­‐year	  period.	  Importantly,	  all	  143	  individual	  banks	  identified	  in	  the	  consultation	  data	  were	  found	  in	  the	  BankScope	  database.	  Individual	  bank’s	  financial	  resources	  are	  measured	  as	  a	  bank’s	  total	  assets	  per	  year	  and	  averaged	  over	  the	  four-­‐year	  period	  of	  this	  analysis.	  Total	  assets	  are	  recorded	  in	  millions	  of	  US$	  and	  are	  log-­‐transformed	  to	  normalize	  distribution.	  	  2. Second,	  and	  to	  operationalize	  H2,	  I	  measure	  the	  international	  scope	  of	  individual	  banks.	  To	   this	   end	   I	   use	   BankScope	   data	   on	   the	   total	   number	   of	   international	   subsidiaries	  owned	  by	  an	  individual	  bank	  averaged	  over	  the	  four	  years	  of	  this	  study.	  	  	  
Domestic	  Banking	  Regulations	  In	  order	  to	  operationalize	  H3	  I	  measured	  domestic	  banking	  regulations	  using	  data	   from	  Barth,	  Caprio,	   and	   Levine’s	   Bank	   Regulation	   and	   Supervision	   database.5	   These	   data	   provide	   a	  comprehensive	  and	  comparative	  overview	  of	  banking	   regulations	   in	  125	  countries	  around	   the	  globe	   based	   on	   information	   derived	   from	   national	   banking	   authorities,	   supervisors	   and	  regulators.6	   I	   use	   four	   primary	   measures	   to	   gauge	   variation	   in	   the	   stringency	   of	   domestic	  banking	  regulations.	  Country-­‐level	  values	  for	  each	  indicator	  are	  then	  linked	  to	  individual	  banks	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using	   BankScope	   data	   on	   bank’s	   ‘main	   domestic	   country’	   (assessed	   in	   terms	   of	   each	   bank’s	  ownership	  structure).	  	  1. Overall	   restrictions	   on	   banks’	   activities	   refer	   to	   a	   bank’s	   ability	   to	   engage	   in	   securities,	  insurance,	  and	  real	  estate	  activities	  according	  to	  existing	  domestic	  regulations.	  For	  each	  activity,	  responses	  are	  recorded	  on	  a	  scale	  ranging	  from	  1	  =	  unrestricted	  (“a	  full	  range	  of	  activities	  can	  be	  conducted	  directly	  by	  banks”);	  2	  =	  permitted	  (“a	  full	  range	  of	  activities	  are	  offered,	  but	  all	  or	   some	  of	   these	  activities	  must	  be	   conducted	   in	   subsidiaries,	  or	   in	  another	  part	  of	  a	  common	  holding	  company	  or	  parent);	  3	  =	  restricted	  (“less	  than	  the	  full	  range	  of	  activities	  can	  be	  conducted	  in	  banks”);	  4	  =	  prohibited	  (“none	  of	  these	  activities	  can	   be	   done	   in	   either	   banks	   or	   subsidiaries,	   or	   in	   another	   part	   of	   a	   common	   holding	  company	  or	  parent”).	  Higher	  score	  correspond	  to	  more	  stringent	  regulations.	  	  2. Official	   supervisory	  powers	  measure	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  official	   supervisory	  authorities	  have	   the	   authority	   to	   take	   specific	   actions	   to	   prevent	   and	   correct	   problems	   in	   the	  banking	   sector.	   This	   indicator	   is	   comprised	   of	   two	   questions:	   1.	   Can	   the	   supervisory	  authority	   force	   a	   bank	   to	   change	   its	   internal	   organizational	   structure	   (yes	   =	   1)?;	   Is	   a	  formal	   consultation	   process	   with	   the	   industry	   and	   the	   public	   required	   prior	   to	   the	  introduction	  of	  new	  regulations	  (yes	  =	  1)?	  The	  sum	  of	  the	  two	  indicators	  forms	  a	  single	  indicator	  where	  higher	  values	  correspond	  to	  more	  stringent	  regulations.	  3. Independence	   of	   supervisory	   authority	   measures	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   the	   supervisory	  authority	   is	   independent	   from	   government	   and	   legally	   protected	   from	   the	   banking	  industry.	   The	   indicator	   is	   comprised	   of	   three	   main	   questions:	   1.	   Are	   the	   supervisory	  bodies	  responsible	  or	  accountable	  to	  a)	  Prime	  Minister,	  b)	  the	  Finance	  Minister	  or	  other	  cabinet	   level	  official,	   c)	   a	   legislative	  body,	   such	  as	  parliament	  or	   congress	   (yes	  =1)?;	  2.	  Are	   the	   supervisors	   legally	   liable	   for	   their	   actions	   	   (i.e.,	   if	   a	   supervisor	   takes	   actions	  against	   a	   bank,	   the	   supervisor	   cannot	   be	   sued)	   (No=1)?;	   3.	   Does	   the	   head	   of	   the	  supervisory	  agency	  (and	  other	  directors)	  have	  a	  fixed	  term	  and	  how	  long	  (=1	  if	  term	  is	  >=4)?	  The	  sum	  for	  all	  responses	  form	  a	  single	  indicator	  where	  higher	  values	  correspond	  to	   greater	   regulatory	   and	   supervisory	   independence	   and,	   therefore,	   more	   stringent	  regulations.	  	  4. Capital	   Adequacy	   Regulations	   is	   an	   index	   comprised	   of	   three	   indicators	   regarding	  national	   regulations	   on	   the	   amount	   of	   capital	   a	   bank	   should	   hold	   relative	   to	   it	   total	  assets:	  1.	  What	  was	  the	  actual	  risk	  based	  capital	  ratio	  of	  the	  banking	  system	  as	  of	  the	  end	  of	  2010?	  This	  question	  asks	  for	  the	  capital	  adequacy	  ratios	  (Tier	  1,	  Tier	  II	  and	  Tier	  III)	  of	  all	   banks	   in	   that	   country;	   2.	   What	   was	   the	   minimum	   required	   risk-­‐based	   regulatory	  capital	   ratio	   as	   of	   the	   end	   of	   2010?	   This	   question	   refers	   to	   “the	   minimum	   capital	  adequacy	   ratios	   required	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  Basel	   I	   and	  Basel	   II”7;	  3.	  What	  was	   the	  actual	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Tier	  1	   capital	   ratio	  of	   the	  banking	   system	  as	  of	   end	  of	  2010?	  This	  question	  asks	  about	  “the	  ratio	  between	  Tier	  I	  capital	  -­‐-­‐	  Tier	  I	  includes	  paid	  up	  share	  capital,	  share	  premiums	  (positive	   difference	   between	   selling	   price	   of	   the	   new	   shares,	   over	   the	   nominal	   value),	  retained	   earnings	   and	   disclosed	   reserves”.8	   Higher	   scores	   on	   this	   index	   correspond	   to	  more	  stringent	  regulations.	  	  H4	   testing	   the	   adjustment	   costs	   argument	   is	   operationalized	   as	   a	   binary	   indicator	   for	  whether	  or	  not	  banks	  where	  using	  Basel	  II	  rules	  as	  of	  2010	  (use	  of	  Basel	  II	  =	  1).	  Banks	  that	  were	  not	  using	  these	  rules	  face	  greater	  adjustment	  costs	  than	  banks	  that	  were.	  Data	  are	  derived	  from	  Barth,	  Caprio,	  and	  Levine’s	  Bank	  Regulation	  and	  Supervision	  survey.	  	  
Control	  Variables	  In	   order	   to	   isolate	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   variables	   listed	   above,	   I	   also	   include	   a	  number	  of	   control	  variables	   in	   the	  regression	  analyses.	  As	  with	  coding	   for	  domestic	  banking	  regulations,	   country	  values	   for	   each	   control	   variable	   are	   linked	   to	   individual	   banks	   using	  BankScope	   data	   on	   each	  bank’s	  “main	  domestic	  country”.	  First,	   I	   include	   two	   control	   variables	   for	   the	   size	   of	   domestic	   financial	  markets.	   For	  many	  scholars,	  the	  size	  of	  financial	  markets	  plays	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  “conditioning	  financial	  power	  on	  the	  global	   stage”	   (Braithwaite	   &	   Drahos,	   2000;	   Drezner,	   2007;	   Wood,	   2005;	   Young,	   2014:	   369).	  Indeed,	  realist	  scholars	  expect	  that	  the	  BCBS,	  like	  many	  international	  organizations,	  is	  simply	  a	  reflection	  of	  state	  power	  (Drezner,	  2007;	  Simmons,	  2001).	  	  In	  particular,	  BCBS	  regulations	  likely	  correspond	   to	   the	   interests	   of	   governments	   (and	  banks)	   from	  states	  with	   the	   largest	   financial	  markets.	  What	  is	  more,	  larger	  financial	  markets	  also	  correspond	  to	  a	  larger	  banking	  sector	  and	  hence	   a	   greater	   number	   of	   banks	   that	   can	   possibly	  mobilize	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   BCBS.	   Finally,	  banks	  from	  larger	  (and	  commonly	  more	  developed)	  markets	  have	  more	  at	  stake	  with	  regard	  to	  changes	   in	   international	  banking	   regulations.	   I	  measure	   this	  variable	  using	   two	   indicators.	   (1)	  
Gross	   domestic	   product	   (GDP)	   per	   capita	   provides	   a	   general	   and	   commonly	   used	   measure	   of	  market	  size	  at	  the	  individual	  country	  level.	  Data	  are	  averaged	  over	  the	  four-­‐year	  period	  of	  this	  analysis,	  are	   in	  current	  U.S.	  dollars,	  and	  derived	  from	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Indicators.	  (2)	  Second,	  I	  also	  include	  a	  measure	  for	  the	  number	  of	  banks	  active	  in	  each	  country	  as	  of	  2010.	  Data	  include	  all	  bank	  types	  and	  are	  derived	  from	  the	  BankScope	  database.	  	  Second,	   I	   include	   a	   control	   variable	   for	   BCBS	   membership.	   Existing	   scholarship	   has	  suggested	  that	  banks	  “domiciled	  in	  the	  countries	  represented	  on	  the	  Committee”	  tend	  to	  also	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  lobby	  the	  BCBS	  (Claessens	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Griffith-­‐Jones	  &	  Persaud,	  2003).	  To	  control	  for	  BCBS	  membership	   I	   created	  a	  binary	  variable	   for	   all	   banks	   from	  countries	   that	   are	  official	  members	   of	   the	   BCBS	   as	   of	   2010.	   There	   are	   a	   total	   of	   27	   official	   BCBS	   member	   countries:	  Argentina,	   Australia,	   Belgium,	   Brazil,	   Canada,	   China,	   France,	   Germany,	   Hong	   Kong,	   India,	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Indonesia,	   Italy,	   Japan,	   Korea,	   Luxembourg,	   Mexico,	   Netherlands,	   Russia,	   Saudi	   Arabia,	  Singapore,	   South	   Africa,	   Spain,	   Sweden,	   Switzerland,	   Turkey,	   United	  Kingdom,	   and	   the	  United	  States.9	   Descriptive	   statistics	   for	   all	   variables	   used	   in	   this	   analysis	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   online	  appendix.	  	  
	  
Analysis	  The	  task	  of	  the	  present	  analysis	  is	  to	  explain	  the	  determinants	  of	  when	  and	  why	  banks	  lobby	  the	  BCBS.	   In	   order	   to	   avoid	   selection	   bias	   resulting	   from	   examining	   only	   those	   banks	   that	   have	  lobbied	  the	  BCBS,	  it	  is	  imperative	  to	  also	  include	  data	  for	  (the	  full	  universe	  of)	  banks	  that	  have	  not.	   Data	   derived	   from	   BCBS	   consultations	   provide	   a	   generally	   accurate	   picture	   of	   bank	  lobbying.	  However,	  there	  is	  unfortunately	  no	  master	  list	  of	  banks	  telling	  us	  about	  the	  banks	  that	  have	  decided	  not	   to	   lobby	  the	  BCBS.	  The	  solution	  proposed	  here	   is	   to	  use	  the	   full	   list	  of	  banks	  included	  in	  the	  BankScope	  dataset	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  the	  universe	  of	  banks.	  This	  dataset	  includes	  over	  33,000	  banks	  from	  179	  countries	  around	  the	  world.	  Importantly,	  the	  BankScope	  database	  has	  been	  subjected	  to	  several	  studies	  examining	  its	  validity	  and	  coverage	  (Bhattacharya,	  2003;	  Cunningham,	  2001;	  De	  Hass,	  Ferreira,	  &	  Taci,	  2010;	  Fries	  &	  Taci,	  2005;	  Gambacorta,	  2005).	  On	  balance,	   these	   studies	   find	   that	   the	   data	   is	   generally	   representative	   for	   most	   countries.	   One	  important	  point	  of	  criticism,	  however,	   is	   that	   the	  data	   for	  banks	   in	  emerging	  market	  countries	  might	   be	   somewhat	   skewed	   toward	   larger	   “top	   tier”	   banks	   (Bhattacharya,	   2003;	   Fries	  &	  Taci,	  2005).	   Whether	   this	   criticism	   is	   still	   valid	   for	   the	   updated	   database	   is	   difficult	   to	   ascertain.	  Nevertheless,	   I	   have	   included	   a	   further	   control	   variable	   accounting	   for	   banks	   located	   in	  emerging	  markets	  (those	  in	  China,	  Brazil,	  India,	  Russia,	  and	  South	  Africa	  =	  1).	  	  Combining	  consultation	  data	  with	   the	  universe	  of	  banks	   in	   the	  BankScope	  data	   reveals	  that	  instances	  of	  lobbying	  the	  BCBS	  only	  account	  for	  approximately	  0.45%	  of	  the	  entire	  dataset.	  As	  such,	  the	  decision	  to	  lobby	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  “rare	  event”,	  a	  binary	  dependent	  variable	  with	  “dozens	   to	   thousands	   of	   times”	   more	   zeros	   than	   ones	   (King	   &	   Zeng,	   2001:	   137).	   While	   not	  unusual	   in	  political	  science	  research	  (e.g.,	  events	  like	  wars),	  such	  rare	  events	  data	  pose	  unique	  challenges	   for	   maximum	   likelihood	   regression	   estimation	   methods.	   Specially,	   a	   standard	  approach	   to	   examining	   a	   binary	   dependent	   variable,	   logit	   estimations,	   tends	   to	   radically	  underestimate	  the	  possibility	  of	  such	  rare	  events	  (King	  &	  Zeng,	  2001:	  138).	  In	  order	  to	  mitigate	  this	  bias	  I	  have	  implemented	  King	  and	  Zeng’s	  (2001)	  bias	  correction	  method	  for	  rare	  events	  logit	  (using	  the	  authors’	  relogit	  statistical	  package).	  While	  this	  approach	  has	  become	  commonplace	  in	  political	  science	  research,	  there	  is	  concern	  that	  this	  correction	  procedure	  may	  “overcorrect”	  for	  bias	   in	  maximum	   likelihood	  estimates	   (Allison,	  2012;	  Leitgöb,	  2013).	  As	   such,	   I	  will	   check	   the	  robustness	   of	   my	   results	   using	   a	   further	   correction	   procedure	   for	   rare	   events	   data,	   namely	  Firth’s	   (1993)	   Penalized	   Maximum	   Likelihood	   Estimation	   method	   (using	   Joseph	   Coveny’s	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firthlogit	   programme).10	   The	   results	   for	   these	   robustness	   checks	   are	   available	   in	   the	   online	  appendix.	  To	  test	  the	  relative	  explanatory	  power	  of	  my	  hypothesis,	  I	  estimate	  a	  series	  of	  two-­‐level	  models	   with	   separate	   error	   components	   at	   the	   individual	   (bank)	   level	   and	   the	   country	   level	  (Goldstein	   1987).	   Table	   2	   presents	   regression	   results	   for	   five	   separate	   models:	   models	   1-­‐4	  individually	  test	  my	  four	  hypotheses	  and	  a	  fifth	  complete	  model	  testing	  all	  indicators	  together.	  A	  test	   for	  multicollinearity	  using	   the	  collin	   command	   in	  Stata	   revealed	  no	  significant	   issues	  with	  the	  key	  regressors.	  	  [Table	  2]	  	  	   Regression	  results	  provide	  considerable	  support	  for	  H1	  and	  H2	  regarding	  the	  impact	  of	  banks’	  organizational	  characteristics	  on	  the	  decision	  to	  lobby.	  First,	  bank	  resources	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  important	  determinant	  of	  the	  decision	  to	  lobby	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  BCBS.	  Indeed,	  models	  1	  and	  5	   suggest	   a	   positive	   and	   statistically	   significant	   correlation	   between	   bank	   resources	   and	  lobbying.	   In	   both	  models,	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   logarithm	   for	   bank	   resources	   corresponds	   to	   an	  approximate	   .8	   increase	   in	   the	   predicted	   log	   odds	   for	   lobbying	   the	   BCBS.	   Figure	   1	   puts	   these	  findings	   in	  context,	  plotting	  marginal	  effects	  of	  bank	  resources	  on	  BCBS	   lobbying	  using	  results	  from	  model	  10.	  We	  can	  see	  that	  the	  first	  instance	  of	  the	  decision	  to	  lobby	  the	  BCBS	  corresponds	  to	  a	  value	  of	  about	  10	  on	  the	  logarithm	  for	  bank	  resources,	  or,	  approximately	  200	  million	  US$.	  A	  similar	  effect	  is	  found	  for	  banks’	  international	  scope.	  Model	  2	  (testing	  hypothesis	  2	  alone),	  finds	  that	  for	  each	  additional	  1000	  international	  subsidiaries	  we	  see	  a	  corresponding	  2.37	  increase	  in	  the	  predicted	  log	  odds	  for	  lobbying	  the	  BCBS.	  Marginal	  effects	  are	  plotted	  in	  figure	  2	  and	  show	  that	   the	   decision	   to	   lobby	   corresponds	   to	   banks’	   possessing	   approximately	   1000	   to	   4000	  international	  subsidiaries.	  	  [Figure	  1	  &	  2]	  	   	  Support	   for	   hypotheses	   1	   and	   2	   give	   further	   purchase	   to	   the	   existing	   scholarship	  predicting	   a	   strong	   correlation	   between	   bank	   wealth	   and	   power	   and	   BCBS	   lobbying	   (Baker,	  2010;	   Igan	  et	   al.,	   2009;	   Johnson	  &	  Kwak,	  2010).	  Naturally,	   these	   results	   can	  only	   suggest	   that	  wealthy	   and	   more	   internationally	   active	   banks	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   lobby	   the	   BCBS	   than	   their	  counterparts.	  While	  confirming	  a	  bias	  in	  the	  BCBS	  toward	  large,	  international	  and	  resource-­‐rich	  banks,	   the	   results	   cannot	   explain	  how	   these	   same	   factors	   translate	   into	   the	  decision	   to	   lobby:	  either	   through	   expensive	   lobbying	   strategies,	   overcoming	   collective	   action	   problems,	   or	  providing	   policy-­‐relevant	   information	   (see	   Lall,	   2012).	   Nevertheless,	   the	   results	   do	   provide	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compelling	  evidence	   that	   lobbying	  on	  Basel	   III,	   like	  Basel	   II	   before	   it,	   appears	   to	   “advance	   the	  interests	   of	   powerful	   market	   players	   with	   less	   regard	   for	   smaller,	   less	   sophisticated	   banks”	  (Claessens	  et	  al.,	  2008:	  314).	  Regression	   results	   provide	   some	   support	   for	   H3,	   predicting	   a	   positive	   correlation	  between	   more	   stringent	   domestic	   banking	   regulations	   and	   BCBS	   lobbying.	   First,	   models	   3	  (testing	  H3)	  suggests	  that	  banks	  facing	  greater	  overall	  restrictions	  on	  activities	  also	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  lobby	  the	  BCBS.	  An	  increase	  in	  the	  stringency	  of	  these	  restrictions	  corresponds	  to	  an	   0.5	   increase	   in	   the	   predicted	   log	   odds	   for	   lobbying	   the	   BCBS.	   Second,	   model	   5	   shows	   a	  positive	   and	   statistically	   significant	   correlation	   between	   capital	   adequacy	   regulations	   and	   a	  bank’s	  decision	  to	  lobby	  the	  BCBS.	  Specifically,	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  stringency	  of	  domestic	  capital	  adequacy	  regulations	  (demanding	  that	  banks	  retain	  a	  greater	  percentage	  of	  capital	  relative	  to	  its	  total	  assets)	  corresponds	  to	  a	  substantial	  2.8	  increase	  in	  the	  predicted	  log	  odds	  for	  lobbying	  the	  BCBS.	  Robustness	  checks	  using	  both	  Firthlogit	  show	  similar	  results	  (see	  online	  appendix).	  How	  can	  we	  explain	   these	  mixed	  results?	  Why,	   in	  particular,	  do	  more	  stringent	  overall	  restrictions	  on	  banks’	  activities	  and	  higher	  capital	  adequacy	  requirements	  drive	  banks	  to	  lobby	  the	  BCBS	  while	  the	  official	  supervisory	  powers	  of	  bank	  regulators	  and	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  supervisory	  authority	  do	  not?	  One	  explanation	  for	  this	  finding	  is	  related	  to	  the	  central	  role	  and	  saliency	  of	   the	  various	  banking	  regulations.	  First,	  restrictions	  on	  banks’	  activities,	   in	  particular	  the	   freedom	   of	   banks	   to	   engage	   in	   securities,	   insurance,	   real	   estate,	   and	   other	   such	   activities	  have	   largely	   been	   linked	   to	   the	   financial	   crisis.	   Regulators	   routinely	   point	   to	   the	   erosion	   of	  barriers	   separating	   commercial	   and	   investment	   banking	   and	   the	   repackaging	   of	   mortgage-­‐related	   debt	   as	   structured	   finance	   as	   key	   determinants	   of	   the	   crisis	   (BIS,	   2008;	   FSA,	   2009).	  Further,	  fierce	  lobbying	  campaigns	  in	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  period	  have	  seen	  banks	  scrambling	  to	  roll-­‐back	   regulations	   limiting	   these	   same	   activities	   (Lipton	   &	   Protess,	   2013).	   Second,	   capital	  adequacy	  regulations	  have	  been	  similarly	  central	  to	  issue	  related	  to	  global	  banking	  regulations	  in	   the	  post-­‐crisis	  period.	   Indeed,	  capital	  adequacy	  regulations	  stand	  at	   the	  very	  center	  of	  most	  debates	  about	  bank	  regulations.	  As	  Singer	  (2007:	  2)	  puts	  it,	  capital	  adequacy	  regulations	  “go	  to	  the	   heart	   of	   a	   financial	   institution’s	   operations	   and	   can	   affect	   profitability,	   foreign	  competitiveness,	  corporate	  strategy,	  and	  even	  survivability.	  Negotiations	  over	  capital	  adequacy	  […]	   are	   therefore	   invariably	   contentious”.	   	   What	   is	   more,	   introducing	   more	   stringent	   capital	  adequacy	  standards	  was	  a	  central	  component	  of	   the	  Basel	   III	  negotiations	  (BIS,	  2008;	  Hellwig,	  2010:	  2).	  While	  oversight	  mechanisms	  are	  part	   of	   the	   larger	  narrative	  on	   the	   role	  of	  banks	   in	  helping	  to	  weaken	  the	  global	  financial	  regulatory	  architecture,	  capital	  adequacy	  regulations	  and	  restrictions	   on	   banks’	   financial	   activities	   have	   been	   the	   central	   focus	   of	   domestic	   and	  international	  regulators	  following	  the	  crisis.	  It	  was	  therefore	  primarily	  the	  prospect	  of	  the	  BCBS	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ratcheting	   up	   these	   restrictions	   that	   pushed	   banks	   to	   seek	   a	  more	   level	   international	   playing	  field	  via	  the	  BCBS	  and	  its	  new	  Accord.	  	   Results	   for	   H4	   provide	   little	   evidence	   that	   banks	   facing	   greater	   adjustment	   costs	   are	  more	  likely	  to	  take	  their	  lobbying	  efforts	  to	  the	  international	  level.	  More	  specifically,	  banks	  not	  already	  using	  Basel	   II	  are	  no	  more	   inclined	  to	   lobby	  the	  BCBS	  than	  those	  using	  Basel	   II.	  Taken	  together	  with	  the	  results	  for	  H3,	  these	  findings	  suggest	  that	  patterns	  of	  bank	  lobbying	  the	  BCBS	  are	  more	   about	   bank	   competitiveness	   than	   adjustment	   costs.	   It	  might	   be	   the	   case	   that	   banks	  facing	  more	  adjustment	  costs	  (using	  Basel	  I	  or	  some	  other,	  less	  stringent	  set	  of	  regulations)	  are	  simply	   not	   part	   of	   the	   active	   community	   of	   banks	   seeking	   influence	   at	   the	   BCBS.	   They	   either	  stand	  outside	  the	  sphere	  of	  influence	  of	  the	  BCBS	  (as	  indicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  not	  yet	  implemented	   Basel	   II)	   or	   are	  marginalized	   by	   larger,	  more	   powerful	   banks	   that	   have	   already	  sought	  to	  influence	  Basel	  II.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  banks	  that	  do	  mobilize	  to	  lobby	  the	  BCBS	  tend	  to	  be	   wealthy	   and	   have	   considerable	   international	   scope.	   It	   stands	   to	   reason	   that	   their	   main	  concern	   is	   levelling	   the	   regulatory	   playing	   field	   with	   their	   international	   competitors.	  What	   is	  more,	   the	   goal	   of	   lobbying	   the	   BCBS	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   ensuring	   less	   stringent	   regulations,	   but	  rather	  ensuring	  that	  all	  banks	  play	  by	  the	  same	  rules.	  	  	  	  Finally,	   for	   the	   control	   variables,	   there	   is	   mixed	   support	   for	   the	   idea	   that	   a	   banks’	  decision	  to	  lobby	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  size	  of	  domestic	  financial	  markets.	  Country-­‐level	  indicators	  for	  the	  size	  of	  domestic	  financial	  markets	  measured	  as	  GDP	  show	  few	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	   five	   models.	   Size	   of	   domestic	   markets	   measured	   as	   the	   number	   of	   banks	   per	   country,	  however,	   tells	  a	  different	  story.	  For	  all	  of	  the	  models,	   the	  more	  commercial	  banks	  per	  country,	  the	   less	   likely	   an	   individual	   bank	   from	   that	   country	   will	   decide	   to	   lobby	   the	   BCBS.	  	  This	  unexpected	  result	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  crowding	  in	  the	  BCBS	  lobbying	  community.	  Individual	   banks	   from	   countries	  with	   a	   larger	   overall	   banking	   population	  will	   have	   less	   of	   an	  incentive	  to	  lobby	  simply	  because	  other	  banks	  may	  already	  be	  representing	  their	  interests	  at	  the	  BCBS.	   There	   are	   few	   additional	   selective	   incentives	   for	   such	   banks	   to	   lobby	   and	   hence	   larger	  collective	   action	   problems.	   A	   further	   control	   variable,	   BCBS	  membership,	   does	   not	   appear	   to	  have	  any	  bearing	  on	  a	  bank’s	  decision	  to	  lobby,	  showing	  no	  significant	  differences	  across	  any	  of	  the	  models.	  Banks	  from	  BCBS	  member	  countries	  are	  no	  more	  likely	  to	  lobby	  the	  Committee	  than	  banks	   from	  non-­‐member	   states.	  Taken	   together	  with	   the	   results	   for	  H2,	   it	   appears	   that	  banks	  lobby	  regardless	  of	  their	  national	  origin,	  and	  second,	  that	  international	  banks	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  seek	   influence	   over	  BCBS	   regulatory	   outputs	   (see	   Claessens	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Lall,	   2012).11	   Finally,	  banks	  located	  in	  emerging	  markets	  show	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  any	  of	  the	  models.	  	  
Conclusions	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This	   article	   examines	   the	   determinants	   of	   bank	   lobbying	   in	   the	   BCBS.	   Despite	   an	   increased	  scholarly	   interest	   in	   bank	   lobbying	   activities	   following	   the	   recent	   financial	   crisis	   as	   well	   as	  speculation	   about	   the	   undue	   lobbying	   influence	   of	   banks	   over	   domestic	   and	   global	   financial	  regulation,	   little	   research	   had	   addressed	   the	   fundamental	   question	   of	   when	   and	   why	   banks	  decide	   to	   lobby	   the	  BCBS.	  Further,	  what	   factors	  explain	  why	  some	  banks	  mobilize	   in	  an	  effort	  influence	  BCBS	  regulations	  while	  others	  do	  not?	  The	  scant	  work	  that	  does	  exist	  proposes	  several	  explanations	   for	   BCBS	   lobbying	   but	   does	   not	   bring	   them	   together	   in	   a	   single,	   comprehensive	  analysis.	  This	  article	  addresses	  this	  shortcoming	  by	  testing	  several	  hypotheses	  for	  bank	  lobbying	  in	  the	  BCBS	  and	  employing	  a	  large-­‐n	  quantitative	  analysis	  of	  over	  33,000	  banks	  worldwide.	  	  This	  article	  marks	  both	  a	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  advance	  on	  existing	  research.	  	  First,	  it	  complements	  an	  explanation	  of	  bank	   lobbying	  based	  on	  organizational	   characteristics	  with	  an	  institutional	  explanation	  related	  to	  domestic	  banking	  regulations.	  Together,	   these	  explanations	  provide	  insight	  into	  both	  the	  capacity	  of	  banks	  to	  lobby	  as	  well	  as	  their	  motivation	  for	  doing	  so.	  	  A	  second	  advance	  is	  related	  to	  the	  empirical	  approach	  of	  this	  analysis.	  This	  article	  is	  the	  first	  to	  examine	  bank	  lobbying	  in	  the	  BCBS	  against	  a	  large	  population	  of	  banks	  that	  have	  not	  lobbied	  the	  BCBS.	  This	  approach	  has	  the	  benefit	  of	  addressing	  issues	  of	  selection	  bias	  that	  would	  otherwise	  result	  from	  examining	  only	  those	  banks	  that	  have	  lobbied	  the	  BCBS.	  	  The	   central	   findings	   presented	   in	   this	   analysis	   confirm	   three	   of	   my	   hypotheses.	   First,	  banks	   with	   greater	   resources	   as	   well	   as	   those	   that	   are	   more	   internationally	   active	   are	   more	  likely	  to	  lobby	  the	  BCBS.	  Second,	  banks	  facing	  more	  stringent	  domestic	  banking	  regulations	  are	  also	  more	   likely	   to	   lobby.	   However,	   there	   is	   little	   evidence	   linking	   the	   decision	   to	   lobby	   and	  adjustment	  costs.	  Importantly,	  while	  providing	  support	  for	  three	  of	  my	  hypotheses,	  this	  analysis	  is	   limited	   in	   its	   ability	   to	   explain	   the	   causal	   mechanisms	   linking	   explanatory	   variables	   and	   a	  bank’s	   decision	   to	   lobbying.	   For	   instance,	   how	   do	   superior	   resources	   and	   a	   larger	   number	   of	  international	   subsidiaries	   translate	   into	   the	  decision	   to	   lobby?	  Digging	  more	  deeply	   into	   these	  causal	   mechanisms	   could	   be	   best	   explored	   in	   future	   research,	   especially	   research	   employing	  detailed	   case	   studies	   of	   bank	   lobbying	   of	   the	   BCBS.	   Future	   research	   could	   also	   examine	   in	  greater	   detail	   the	   differences	   revealed	   in	   this	   analysis	   between	   the	   various	   dimensions	   of	  domestic	   banking	   regulations	   and	   bank	   lobbying.	   While	   capital	   adequacy	   regulations	   and	  restrictions	   on	   banking	   activities	   may	   be	   important	   and	   contentious	   aspects	   of	   domestic	  regulations,	   why	   are	   banks	   less	   motivated	   by	   more	   stringent	   oversight	   and	   supervisory	  mechanisms	   of	   banking	   regulations?	   Are	   these	   other	   dimensions	   of	   domestic	   banking	  regulations	  perceived	  as	  less	  of	  a	  burden	  on	  banks’	  international	  competitiveness?	  Investigation	  into	  these	  questions	  will	  certainly	  help	  us	  flesh	  out	  our	  understanding	  of	  banks’	  decision	  to	  take	  their	  lobbying	  efforts	  to	  the	  BCBS.	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Tables	  and	  Figures	  
	   Table	  1:	  Distribution	  of	  Banking	  Industry	  Actors	  Lobbying	  the	  BCBS	  (2010-­‐2014)	  	  	   Number	  of	  Consultation	  Contributions	   Number	  of	  Unique	  Actors	  Actor	  Type	   Frequency	   %	   Frequency	   %	  Commercial	  Banks	   217	   41,97	   51	   35,66	  Bank	  Holding	  &	  Holding	  Companies	   72	   13,93	   28	   19,58	  Central	  Bank	   53	   10,25	   15	   10,49	  Finance	  Companies	   62	   11,99	   14	   9,79	  Securities	  firm	   22	   4,26	   7	   4,90	  Clearing	  Institutions	  &	  Custody	   18	   3,48	   6	   4,20	  Investment	  banks	   15	   2,90	   5	   3,50	  Multi-­‐lateral	  government	  banks	   12	   2,32	   5	   3,50	  Specialized	  governmental	  credit	  institution	   19	   3,68	   4	   2,80	  Savings	  bank	   17	   3,29	   3	   2,10	  Cooperative	  Bank	   7	   1,35	   2	   1,40	  Real	  Estate	  and	  mortgage	  bank	   2	   0,39	   2	   1,40	  Other	  non-­‐banking	  credit	  institution	   1	   0,19	   1	   0,7	  Total	   517	   100	   143	   100.00	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  Table	  2:	  Determinants	  of	  Bank	  Lobbying	  in	  the	  BCBS	  (rare	  events	  logit)	  	  	   (1)	  H1	   (2)	  H2	   (3)	  H3	   (4)	  H4	   (5)	  Full	  Model	  Bank	  Assets	   0.829***	   	   	   	   0.806***	  	   (12.57)	   	   	   	   (13.49)	  International	  Scope	   	   2.375***	   	   	   0.985***	  	   	   (6.22)	   	   	   (15.72)	  Overall	  Restriction	  on	  Activities	   	   	   0.530*	   	   0.109	  	   	   	   (2.36)	   	   (0.50)	  Official	  Supervisory	  Power	   	   	   0.0859	   	   -­‐0.334	  	   	   	   (0.22)	   	   (-­‐0.89)	  Independence	  of	  Supervisory	  Authority	   	   	   0.00709	   	   -­‐0.296	  	   	   	   (0.02)	   	   (-­‐1.07)	  Capital	  Adequacy	  Requirement	   	   	   -­‐0.239	   	   2.881***	  	   	   	   (-­‐0.15)	   	   (3.83)	  Using	  Basel	  II	   	   	   	   0.238	   1.302	  	   	   	   	   (0.27)	   (1.83)	  GDP	   -­‐0.0305	   0.155	   0.387*	   0.142	   -­‐0.153	  	   (-­‐0.23)	   (1.07)	   (2.12)	   (0.78)	   (-­‐0.76)	  Size	  of	  Banking	  Sector	   -­‐0.134***	   -­‐0.456***	   -­‐0.360***	   -­‐0.346***	   -­‐0.273**	  	   (-­‐3.70)	   (-­‐4.60)	   (-­‐3.61)	   (-­‐5.61)	   (-­‐3.17)	  BCBS	  Member	   0.237	   0.755*	   0.244	   0.745*	   0.0849	  	   (0.85)	   (2.04)	   (0.64)	   (2.04)	   (0.26)	  Banks	  in	  Emerging	  Markets	   0.00890	   0.284	   1.517*	   0.109	   -­‐0.0953	  	   (0.01)	   (0.36)	   (1.97)	   (0.13)	   (-­‐0.13)	  	   	   	   	   	   	  Constant	   -­‐12.10***	   -­‐7.002***	   -­‐10.21***	   -­‐6.972***	   -­‐11.42***	  	   (-­‐8.81)	   (-­‐5.21)	   (-­‐3.78)	   (-­‐5.00)	   (-­‐4.86)	  N	   28744	   29190	   22136	   28983	   21697	  t	  statistics	  in	  parentheses	  *	  p	  <	  0.05,	  **	  p	  <	  0.01,	  ***	  p	  <	  0.001	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Figure 2: Lobbying the BCBS and International Scope
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  to	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  and	  third	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  (agenda	  setting	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  and	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  power)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  “power	  of	  inaction”,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Woll	  (2014),	  are	  not	  part	  of	  this	  analysis.	  While	  these	  other	  types	  of	  lobbying	  power	  are	  important,	  they	  are	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  captured	  by	  the	  empirical	  approach	  taken	  in	  this	  analysis,	  which	  draws	  on	  consultation	  documents	  for	  an	  assessment	  of	  bank	  lobbying	  in	  the	  BCBS.	  Such	  consultation	  processes	  reflect	  the	  type	  of	  direct	  lobbying,	  especially	  as	  it	  is	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  exchange	  of	  information,	  that	  is	  best	  captured	  by	  the	  first	  face	  of	  power.	  	  2	  Lall	  (2012)	  presents	  a	  contrasting	  view,	  arguing	  that	  bank	  resources	  played	  an	  insignificant	  role	  for	  banks	  seeking	  to	  influence	  the	  Basel	  II	  Accord.	  Instead,	  the	  key	  explanatory	  factor	  for	  Lall	  was	  timing:	  banks	  that	  were	  about	  to	  begin	  lobbying	  early	  on	  had	  the	  most	  influence	  over	  Basel	  II.	  	  3	  This	  modified	  scheme	  allows	  for	  actor	  types	  that	  are	  not	  accounted	  for	  by	  ISIC,	  like	  NGOs,	  religious	  groups,	  and	  citizen	  groups.	  	  	  4	  The	  BankScope	  database	  	  can	  be	  accessed	  online	  at:	  https://bankscope.bvdinfo.com/version-­‐20141222/home.serv?product=scope2006	  5	  The	  Bank	  Regulation	  and	  Supervision	  database	  can	  be	  found	  at:	  http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html	  6	  A	  full	  list	  of	  countries	  included	  in	  this	  survey	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  online	  appendix.	  7	  Question	  overview	  for	  the	  Bank	  Regulation	  survey:	  http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html#Survey_III	  (accessed	  20.1.2015)	  8	  Ibid.	  9	  The	  European	  Union	  is	  also	  an	  official	  member	  of	  the	  BCBS.	  	  I	  have	  not	  coded	  each	  EU	  state	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  constructing	  this	  control	  variable.	  Instead	  I	  have	  created	  an	  additional,	  separate	  control	  for	  the	  EU	  (all	  EU	  member	  states	  as	  of	  2010	  =	  1)	  for	  use	  in	  the	  robustness	  checks	  run	  for	  this	  analysis	  (see	  online	  appendix).	  	  10	  Exact	  logistic	  regression	  also	  corrects	  for	  rare	  events	  bias	  but	  works	  best	  for	  small	  N	  (<200)	  datasets	  and	  when	  covariates	  are	  primarily	  discrete	  (and	  preferably	  dichotomous).	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  11	  Griffith-­‐Jones	  and	  Persaud	  (2003:	  2)	  present	  contrasting	  evidence	  that	  BCBS	  regulations	  are	  excessively	  influence	  by	  	  “large	  financial	  institutions	  domiciled	  in	  the	  countries	  represented	  on	  the	  Committee”	  (cited	  in	  Lall	  2011:	  615)	  
